We study a class of private information retrieval (PIR) methods that we call one-shot schemes. The intuition behind one-shot schemes is the following. The user's query is regarded as a dot product of a query vector and the message vector (database) stored at multiple servers. Privacy, in an information theoretic sense, is then achieved by encrypting the query vector using a secure linear code, such as secret sharing. Several PIR schemes in the literature, in addition to novel ones constructed here, fall into this class. One-shot schemes provide an insightful link between PIR and data security against eavesdropping. However, their download rate is not optimal, i.e., they do not achieve the PIR capacity. Our main contribution is two transformations of one-shot schemes, which we call refining and lifting. We show that refining and lifting one-shot schemes gives capacity-achieving schemes for the cases when the PIR capacity is known. In the other cases, when the PIR capacity is still unknown, refining and lifting one-shot schemes gives, for most parameters, the best download rate so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E CONSIDER the problem of designing private information retrieval (PIR) schemes on coded data stored on multiple servers that can possibly collude. In this setting, a user wants to download a message from a server with M messages while revealing no information about which message it is interested in. The database is replicated on N servers, or, in general, is stored using a fixed erasure code, typically a maximum distance separable (MDS) code. Some of these servers could possibly collude to gain information about the identity of the user's retrieved message.
The PIR problem was first introduced and studied in [1] and [2] , and was followed up by a large body of work (e.g. [3] - [8] ). The model there assumes the database to be replicated and focuses on PIR schemes with efficient total communication rate, i.e., upload and download. Motivated by big data applications and recent advances in the theory of codes for distributed storage, there has been a growing interest in designing PIR schemes that can query data that is stored in coded form and not just replicated. For this setting, the assumption has been that the messages being retrieved are very large (compared to the queries) and therefore the Manuscript focus has been on designing PIR schemes that minimize the download rate [9] . Despite significant recent progress, the problem of characterizing the optimal PIR download rate (called PIR capacity) in the case of coded data and server collusion remains open in general.
Related work: For replicated data, the problem of finding the PIR capacity, i.e., minimum download rate, is solved. It was shown in [4] and [5] that the PIR capacity is
where N is the number of servers, T is the number of colluding servers and M is the number of messages. Capacity achieving PIR schemes were also presented in [4] and [5] . When the data is coded and stored on a large number of servers (exponential in the number of messages), it was shown in [10] that downloading one extra bit is enough to achieve privacy. This was later improved on [11] by considering a bounded number of servers. In [9] , the authors derived bounds on the tradeoff between storage cost and download cost for linear coded data and studied properties of PIR schemes on MDS data. Explicit constructions of efficient PIR scheme on MDS data were first presented in [12] for both collusions and no collusions. Improved PIR schemes for MDS coded data with collusions were presented in [13] . PIR schemes for general linear codes, not necessarily MDS, were studied in [14] . The PIR capacity for MDS coded data and no collusion was determined in [15] , and remains unknown for the case of collusions, the topic of this paper. Table I summarizes the PIR capacity results known in the literature prior to this work.
One of the main results of this work is improving the achievable PIR rate for coded data with collusion from the rate R = N −K−T +1 N in the bottom right corner of Table I 
To do this we begin by considering a simple class of schemes, we call one-shot schemes, which we modify to improve the rate. We now give the intuition behind one-shot schemes through an example, presenting them formally in Section III. 0018-9448 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information. Fig. 1 . Given a one-shot scheme we can apply the Refinement Lemma to obtain a refined scheme with a better rate for M = 2 messages. Lifting this scheme, through the Refine and Lift Theorem, we obtain a refined and lifted scheme with better rate for any number, M , of messages. When M → ∞ the rate of the refined and lifted scheme converges to that of the one-shot scheme. 
An Example of a One-Shot Scheme:
A natural approach to PIR is to hide the queries from the servers using a linear secure code. We revisit the two-server toy-example presented in [1] .
are stored, replicated, onto two non-colluding servers and a user is interested in retrieving W i privately. The user can use the following scheme, where D, q denotes the inner product between the vectors Table II are defined as follows:
• The vector q ∈ F M 2 is chosen uniformly at random. • The vector e i is the i-th vector of the standard basis of F M 2 . The user can retrieve W i by summing both responses,
The scheme is private since, from any of the servers' point of view, the query they received is a uniformly random vector. The PIR rate of this scheme is 1/2 since the user downloaded 2 bits, D, q and D, q + e i , to retrieve 1 bit, W i .
In Example 1, the user sends two types of queries to the servers: "noise" queries, which provide no useful information to the user, like the query, q, sent to Server 1, and "mixed" queries, which hide the information being retrieved from the server, like the query, q + e i , sent to Server 2.
A one-shot scheme follows this same structure. The user sends "noise" queries to the first r servers and "mixed" queries to the remaining N − r servers. We call the parameter, r, denoting the number of "noise" queries, the codimension of the one-shot scheme. The PIR rate of a one-shot scheme is determined by its codimension and is given by N −r N .
Contributions:
In what follows, N is the number of servers, any T of which may collude, M is the number of messages, and the messages are stored as an (N, K)-MDS code. Also, we do not consider the code a design parameter for the PIR scheme.
Our main result, illustrated in figures 1 and 2, is a constructive combinatorial procedure, that we call refinement and lifting, presented in Sections IV and V, which improves the rate of any one-shot scheme.
Theorem 1 (The Refine and Lift Theorem (Informal)). Any one-shot scheme with codimension r and, consequently, rate (N − r)/N can be refined and lifted to a PIR scheme with rate
More so, refining and lifting one-shot schemes, we obtain capacity-achieving schemes for the cases when the PIR capacity is known and the best known rates for most cases when the capacity is not known. Applying Theorem 1 to the one-shot scheme in [13] , we obtain a PIR scheme with rate conjectured to be optimal in [13] but which was later disproven in [16] . Indeed, to the best of the authors' knowledge, the counterexample in [16] is the only known scheme to outperform the scheme in Corollary 1. The schemes in [16] , however, are limited to the cases where M = 2 and K = N − 1 and to a specific case where N = 4, K = 2, T = 2, and M = 2. More recently, it was shown in [17] that the rate conjectured in [13] holds for linear PIR schemes.
Corollary 1.
Refining and lifting the scheme presented in [13] we obtain a PIR scheme with rate Another interesting consequence of our procedure is that applying it to a T -private linear secret sharing scheme we obtain the same capacity-achieving rate as the scheme presented in [5] , but with fewer queries.
Corollary 2.
Refining and lifting a T -private linear secret sharing scheme we obtain a PIR scheme with capacityachieving rate
II. SETTING
A set of M messages, {W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W M } ⊆ F L q , are stored distributively on N servers using some fixed (N, K)-MDS code, the same for each message, as shown in Table IV . We denote by W j i ∈ F L/K q , the data corresponding to W j stored on server i. Since the code is MDS, each message, W j , is completely determined by any K-subset of {W j 1 , . . . , W j N }. We note that in our settings the code being used to store the data is fixed, i.e. it is not a design parameter for the PIR scheme.
A user wants to retrieve a message W m , where the index m ∈ [M ] = {1, 2, . . . , M}, subject to T -privacy, i.e. without revealing any information about the message identity, the index m, to any subset of at most T colluding servers. To retrieve the message, W m , privately, the user generates N queries Q m 1 , . . . , Q m N . Since the user has no knowledge about the messages, the queries must be independent of the messages. For each i ∈ [N ], the user sends the query Q m i to Server i which then generates an answering string A m i , a deterministic function of Q m i , and sends it to the user. 
We denote a scheme by
is the N -tuple of queries which the user will send to each server when they wish to retrieve W m . A PIR scheme is a scheme which satisfies conditions (6) and (7) .
The measure of performance we are interested in is the PIR rate,
where L is the the length of the message. The PIR rate is the worst case download rate over all message choices. We only consider linear PIR schemes, where the queries sent to the servers are a list of vectors, and the servers respond by sending back the inner product of their data with the queries. In technical terms, we denote the data on server i
A linear query, from now on simply referred to as a query, is a vector q ∈ F ML/K q . When a user sends a query q to a server i, this server responds with the inner product D i , q ∈ F q .
Since the notation in this work is quite heavy, we present a list of symbols and their descriptions in Table III . Remark 1. We often identify random variables with their realizations, e.g. we may treat a query q as both a random variable or a vector.
Remark 2.
In this work we focus on the case where the messages being retrieved are very large. In these cases, the communication cost is dominated by the download rate [9] . Because the files are very large, we do not worry about divisibility conditions for our schemes. Given the parameters N, K, T , and M we need only to show that there exists a growing sequence of L which achieves a certain download rate.
III. ONE-SHOT SCHEMES
In this section, we introduce the notion of a one-shot scheme. The main idea behind one-shot schemes is encrypting 
A. The Definition of a One-Shot Scheme
One of the main ideas behind our schemes is querying the messages individually. For this we will need to consider the following linear subspaces. Definition 1. We denote by
the subspace of queries which only query the j-th message. By x j (i) we mean the i-th coordinate of x j ∈ F ML/K q . Definition 2 (One-Shot Schemes). Assume the setting described in Section II and that the user is interested in W j . An (N, K, T, M )-one-shot scheme of codimension r is a scheme in which the queries have the following form.
The queries in Table V are defined as follows: (P1) The q 1 , . . . , q N ∈ F ML/K q and x j 1 , . . . , x j N −r ∈ V j . (P2) For every i > T , the query q i is a linear combination of q 1 , . . . , q T . (P3) Any collection of T queries sent to the servers is uniformly and independently distributed.
We refer to queries of the form q * + x j * as mixed queries, where the noisy query q * is hiding the informative query x j * .
Although one shot-schemes satisfy T -privacy, via Property (P3), they do not necessarily satisfy the correctness condition in (6) . This will be rectified in Proposition 1. Through properties 4 and (P5), the one-shot scheme is a able to decode the informative queries, obtaining N − r desired symbols out of a total of N downloaded symbols. Note also that for property (P3) to hold, the codimension must satisfy r ≥ T . Indeed, it follows from [17] that the smallest value for r is r = K + T − 1.
Definition 3 (Query and Decoding Equations). Consider the one-shot scheme in Definition 2.
Property (P2) implies that, for every i > T , there exists an equation of the form We call these equations, one for every i > T, the query equations of the one-shot scheme. Property (P5) implies that, for every i > r, there exists an equation of the form
We call these equations, one for every i > r, the decoding equations of the one-shot scheme.
We now give two examples of one-shot schemes. In Example 2, we show a one-shot scheme which happens to satisfy the Correctness condition in (6) , and is, therefore, a PIR scheme.
3 are stored, replicated, onto N = 4 servers, where at most T = 2 of them collude, and a user is interested in retrieving W 1 privately. The user can use the following one-shot scheme.
The queries in Table VI are defined as follows:
are chosen uniformly at random. • The vectors e 1 and e 2 are the first two vectors of the standard basis of F 2M 3 . This scheme is private since for any two servers the queries are uniformly and independently distributed.
The two query equations of this one-shot scheme are
The two decoding equations of this one-shot scheme are
From these equations and the responses from the server, the user can retrieve
where A 1 i is the answer from server i. Thus, the user is able to retrieve all of W 1 . To retrieve the message with 2 symbols, the user has to download 4 achieving a PIR rate of R = 1/2.
In Example 3, we show a one-shot scheme which does not satisfy the Correctness condition in (6) , and is, therefore, not a PIR scheme. However, we show how to obtain a PIR scheme from repeating the one-shot scheme multiple times.
Example 3 (Coded Data). Suppose M messages are stored using a (4, 2)-MDS code over F 3 as in Table VII. Suppose the user is interested in the first message, W 1 , and wants 2-privacy, i.e., at most 2 servers can collude. The following is a (4, 2, 2, M)-one-shot scheme taken from [12] . The queries in Table VIII are defined as follows:
3 are uniformly and independently distributed. • The vectors q 3 = q 1 + q 2 and q 4 = q 1 + 2q 2 . • The vector e 1 is the first vector of the standard basis of F M 3 . This scheme is private since for any two servers the queries are uniformly and independently distributed.
The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme is
From this equation the user can retrieve
To retrieve 1 symbol of the desired message the user has to download 4 symbols in total. The scheme, however, does not satisfy correctness, since the user has not retrieved the whole of W 1 . To do this, we must repeat it 2 times. To get a different combination we will have to change where we introduce our mixed query. Consider the following query structure, analogous to the one in Table VIII . The queries in Table IX are defined as follows:
• The vectors q 5 , q 6 ∈ F M 3 are uniformly and independently distributed. • The vectors q 7 = q 5 + q 6 and q 8 = q 5 + 2q 6 . • The vector e 1 is the first vector of the standard basis of F M 3 . The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme, analogous to (14) , can be written as
Now, having both W 1 1 + 2W 1 2 and W 1 1 + W 1 2 , the user can decode W 1 . To retrieve 2 desired symbols the user had to download 8 symbols in total. Thus, the rate of the one-shot scheme is R = 1/4. Note that this is the same proportion of desired symbols to total symbols that is obtained by a single use of the one-shot scheme. The construction in Example 3 can be generalized to any one-shot scheme. Thus, from any one-shot scheme, a PIR scheme can be obtained. The PIR rate of the scheme will depend solely on the codimension of the one-shot scheme.
Proposition 1.
Let Q be a one-shot scheme with codimension r. Then, there exists a PIR scheme Q with rate
Proof. We assume L = K(N − r) and that the user is interested in the j-th message, W j . We construct Q as follows.
The queries in Table X are defined as follows:
are chosen with the same distribution as queries
The scheme is T -Private since, from (P3) of Definition 2, for any collection of T colluding servers, all queries are uniformly random.
We now prove correctness. Consider the first row in Table X . The decoding equations of the one-shot scheme imply that
Thus, for every
where A j i is the set of answers that server i sends to the user. For the second row, the decoding equations of the one-shot scheme imply in, for every
In particular, D N , q 2,N ∈span{D 1 , q 1,1 , . . . , D r , q 1,r }, and therefore, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N − r,
Thus, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N − r,
More generally, for rows 3 ≤ l ≤ K, for every
Therefore, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N − r, the user has K inner products D r+i−l , e i , for 1 ≤ l ≤ K. Since the messages are stored as an (N, K)-MDS code, this is sufficient for the user to decode W j l (i) = D l , e j i , for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N − r and 1 ≤ l ≤ K. Thus, the user is able to decode W j .
From now on, when we refer to a one-shot scheme as a PIR scheme, we will mean the scheme in Proposition 1.
Remark 3. The schemes in Examples 2 and 3 do not work over the base field F 2 . The reason for this is that the decoding equations (10), (11) , (14) , and (16) all have 2 as a coefficient. Since F 2 has characteristic 2, the coefficient 2 is equal to 0. In general, given a one-shot scheme, the base field must have a characteristic which is compatible with the coefficients of the decoding equations. For simplicity, we always consider that the base field has characteristic larger than the largest coefficient in the decoding equations.
B. One-Shot Schemes From the Literature
In this section, we reinterpret some schemes from the literature as one-shot schemes. As usual, N denotes the number of servers, T the number of colluding servers, M the number of messages and the messages are stored as an (N, K)-MDS code.
Replicated Data: Assume the user is interested in the jth message, W j . When the messages are replicated among the servers, i.e. K = 1, a T -private linear secret sharing scheme [18] can be transformed into a one-shot scheme, with codimension r = T .
Definition 4 (T -private Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). Suppose a user wants to store N −T messages, M 1 , . . . , M N −T ∈ F L q , on N servers privately, in the sense that no T colluding servers are able to obtain any information about any of the messages. A T -private linear secret sharing scheme solves this by doing the following. Generate private keys q 1 , . . . , q T ∈ F L q uniformly at random. Choose q T +1 , . . . , q N ∈ F L q such that q 1 , . . . , q N ∈ F L q is an (N, T )-MDS code. Then, store the messages in the servers as shown in Table XI .
The T -private linear secret sharing scheme in Definition 4 can be transformed into a PIR scheme in the following way. Assume the user is interested in the j-th message, W j . Then, the user can hide the queries of interest, e j 1 , . . . , e j N −T , in the The queries in Table XII are defined as follows:
are chosen uniformly at random.
The schemes in Examples 1 and 2 are secret sharing schemes. The rate of these schemes is given by R = N −T N , as per Proposition 1, and is known [4] to be asymptotically optimal when the number of messages, M , goes to infinity.
MDS Coded Data:
The first one-shot schemes for coded and non-replicated databases were presented in [12] . An improved version of these schemes was given in Theorem 3 of [19] , which in our notation, has codimension r = NK−N +T K . An improved PIR scheme for MDS coded data with collusions was presented in [13] . This scheme is a one-shot scheme, as a consequence of equation (28) in [13] , which in our notation has codimension r = K + T − 1. It is easy to compare the rate of these schemes via their codimension. The scheme in [13] outperforms the scheme in [19] unless in the cases where either K = 1 or N = K + T .
C. Geometrical One-Shot Schemes
In this section we will present a new family of one-shot schemes with simple constructions which we refer to as geometrical one-shot schemes. They exist for the parameters K = 2 or N = K + T , and have the same codimension as the schemes in [13] but with a more elementary construction, not requiring the use of the star product.
Construction. Let M messages be stored on N servers, using an (N, K)-MDS code, where at most T servers collude and suppose that the user is interested in the first message, W 1 .
Since the data is stored as an (N, K)-MDS code, there exists unique coefficients λ i j such that, for every i ∈ [T ], and for every l ∈ [K + T, N ],
where D i is the data stored on server i. Suppose that 1 This condition is trivially satisfied when K = 2 or N = K + T . We present the following one-shot scheme.
The queries in Table XIII are defined as follows: Proof. It is easy to check that geometrical one-shot schemes satisfy properties (P1) to (P4) in Definition 2. We now prove that they also satisfy (P5). For every l ∈ [K + T, N ],
So that we get the decoding equations
for every l ∈ [K + T, N ].
In the next example we construct a geometrical one-shot scheme for the setting of Example 3.
Example 4.
Consider the setting of Example 3. Via the geometrical one-shot scheme described in this subsection we obtain the following one-shot scheme.
The queries in Table XIV are defined as follows:
• The vectors q 1 , q 2 ∈ F M 3 are uniformly and independently distributed. • The vectors q 3 = 2q 1 − q 2 and q 4 = −q 1 + q 2 . 1 Note that λ i j (l) = 0 follows from the MDS property of the code. The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme is
IV. THE REFINEMENT LEMMA
In this section we present the first part of our refine and lift operation. The refinement lemma, Lemma 1, to be presented in this section, shows how to improve the rate of a one-shot scheme when the number of messages, M , is equal to 2.
Example 5 (Refined Version of Example 1). Suppose M = 2
two-bit messages, W 1 , W 2 ∈ F 2 2 , are stored, replicated, onto two non colluding servers and a user is interested in retrieving the first message, W 1 , privately.
This setting could be solved by applying the one-shot scheme in Example 1 with a PIR rate of R = 1/2.
Consider, however, the following scheme. The queries in Table XV are defined as follows:
• The vector x 2 1 ∈ V 2 is chosen uniformly at random and such that D, x 2 is linearly independent, which in this case means that x 2 = 0. • The vectors x 1 1 , x 1 2 ∈ V 1 are chosen uniformly at random and such that D, x 1 1 and D, x 1 2 are linearly independent random variables, which in this case means that x 1 1 and x 1 2 are linearly independent. The scheme is private since, from any of the servers' point, the x 1 's and x 2 's are statistically indistinguishable.
To decode W 1 the user uses the following decoding equation
It is no coincidence that (32) has the same form as (2) . Indeed, the role of x 2 1 is analogous to that of q in Example 1. Having the linearly independent D, x 1 1 and D, x 1 2 , the user is able to decode W 1 . By downloading a total of 3 bits, the user is able to privately retrieve the two bits of W 1 . Thus, the PIR rate of this scheme is R = 2/3. This rate actually achieves the capacity for these parameters, given in (1).
Lemma 1 (The Refinement Lemma).
Let Q be a one-shot scheme of codimension r, with rate N −r N . Then, there exists an (N, K, T, 2)-PIR scheme, Q , with rate R Q = N N +r > N −r N = R Q . Proof. We assume L = N K and that the user is interested in the first message, W 1 . If the user is interested in the second message, W 2 , exchange the roles of x 1 and x 2 in the scheme. We construct Q in the following way. The queries in Table XVI are defined as follows:  TABLE XVI QUERY STRUCTURE FOR THE REFINED SCHEME Q • The vectors x 1 i,j ∈ V 1 are chosen uniformly at random, but such that the {D j ,
} are linearly independent random variables. This can be done for the following reason. Consider the vector space generated by the random variables D 1 , . . . , D N over F q . Since they form an (N, K)-MDS code, this space is generated by D 1 , . . . , D K and is therefore isomorphic to F K q . Note that V 1 ∼ = F N q . Since the inner product is a bilinear map, the random variable D j , x 1 i,j belongs to a vector space isomorphic to the tensor product
} are linearly independent random variables is not empty, as the following example shows. Let a 1 , . . . , a n be a basis of F N q and let a i,j ∈ [N ] be such that a i,j ≡ i + j − 1 (mod N ) .
} are linearly independent random variables. Indeed, as q goes to infinity, if we select the x 1 i,j uniformly at random, the chances that {D j ,
} are linearly independent random variables goes to 1.
• For every i ∈ [K], the vectors x 2 i,j ∈ V 2 are chosen with probability distribution induced by q 1 , . . . , q N ∈ F MN q from the one-shot scheme Q, in Definition 2, but such that the {D j , x 2 i,j : j ∈ [T ], i ∈ [K]} are linearly independent random variables. This can be done analogously to the x 1 i,j since the restriction is more lenient, requiring only the first T of them to be linearly independent. Note that this implies that for any J ⊂ [N ] such that |J| = T , the {D j , x 2 i,j : j ∈ J, i ∈ [K]} are linearly independent random variables. This follows from (P2) and (P3) in Definition 2. Indeed, by these properties, it follows that each x 2 i,j with T < j ≤ N is a linear combination with non zero coefficients of all x 2 i,j with j ≤ T . The scheme is private since for any set J ⊂ [N ] of T colluding servers, i.e. |J| = T , the set of queries x 2 i,j are uniformly random conditioned on the {D j , x 2 i,j : j ∈ J, i ∈ [K]} being linearly independent random variables. Thus, x 2 i,j has the same distribution as the x 1 i,j for every j ∈ J. Using the decoding equations of the one-shot scheme, the user is able to retrieve D j , x 1 i,j for every j ∈ [N ] and i ∈ [K]. Since they are all linearly independent and span the whole space of possible answers, it holds that W 1 (k) ∈ span{D j , x 1 i,j } i∈[K],j∈ [N ] , for every k ∈ [N K]. Since the user retrieved N K desired symbols out of a total of K(N + r) symbols, the rate of the scheme is Remark 4. The larger the characteristic of the base field is, the larger the probability that D 1 , x 1 1 , . . . , D N , x 1 N will be linearly independent if the vectors x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 N ∈ V 1 are chosen uniformly at random. Example 6 (Refined Scheme on Replicated Data). Refining the scheme in Example 2 we get the following scheme.
The queries in Table XVII are defined as follows:
• The vectors x 2 1 , x 2 2 ∈ V 2 are chosen uniformly at random and such that D, x 2 1 and D, x 2 2 are linearly independent random variables, which in this case means that x 2 1 and x 2 2 are linearly independent. • The vectors x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 4 ∈ V 1 are chosen uniformly at random and such that D, x 1 1 , . . . , D, x 1 4 are linearly independent random variables, which in this case means that x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 4 are linearly independent. This scheme is private since for any two servers the x 1 * and x 2 * are indistinguishable. The two decoding equations of this one-shot scheme are
From these equations, the user can retrieve D, x 1 3 and D, x 1 4 , which together with D, x 1 1 and D, x 1 2 gives a total of 4 desired symbols retrieved from a total of 6 downloaded ones. Thus, the PIR rate of this scheme is R = 2/3, as per Lemma 1.
It is not always necessary to replicate the one-shot scheme structure K times, as we show in the following example.
Example 7 (Refined Scheme on Coded Data). Refining the scheme in Example 3 we get the following scheme.
The queries in Table XVIII are defined as follows:
• The vectors x 2 1 , x 2 2 ∈ V 2 are chosen uniformly at random and such that D 1 , x 2 1 and D 2 , x 2 2 are linearly independent random variables. • The vectors x 2 3 = x 2 1 + x 2 2 and x 2 4 = x 2 1 + 2x 2 2 . • The vectors x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 4 ∈ V 1 are chosen uniformly at random and such that D 1 , x 1 1 , . . . , D 4 , x 1 4 are linearly independent random variables. This scheme is private since for any two servers the x 1 * and x 2 * are indistinguishable. The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme is
This equation is inherited from the one-shot scheme of Example 3, see (14) . From this equation, the user can retrieve D 4 , x 1 4 , which together with D 1 , x 1 1 , D 2 , x 1 2 , and D 3 , x 1 3 gives a total of 4 units of information retrieved from a total of 7 downloaded. Thus, the PIR rate of this scheme is R = 4/7, as per Lemma 1.
Notice that in this case, we did not need to repeat the scheme K = 2 times. Although doing that will convert any one-shot scheme into a PIR scheme, it is not always necessary. This example, however, is not optimal since the PIR scheme in [16] achieves a rate of 3/5.
V. THE REFINE AND LIFT THEOREM
In this section, we present our main result in Theorem 1. We show how to extend, by means of a lifting operation, the refined scheme on two messages to any number of messages. Informally, the lifting operation consists of two steps: a symmetrization step, and a way of dealing with "leftover" queries that result from the symmetrization. To do this, we introduce a symbolic matrix representation for PIR schemes which simplifies our analysis. We need the following definition.
For example, if x 1 ∈ V 1 , x 2 ∈ V 2 , and x 3 ∈ V 3 , then x 1 is a 1-query, x 1 + x 2 is a 2-query, and x 1 + x 2 + x 3 is a 3-query.
A. An Example of the Lifting Operation
Consider the scheme in Example 7. We represent its structure, given in Table XVIII , by means of the following matrix.
Each column of S 2 corresponds to a server. A value of 1 in column i represents sending all possible combinations of 1-queries of every message to server i, and a value of 2 in column i represents sending all combinations of 2-queries of every message to server i. We call this matrix the symbolic matrix of the scheme.
The codimension r = 3, from the one-shot scheme in Example 7, tells us that for every r = 3 entries with value 1 in the symbolic matrix there is N − r = 1 entries with value 2. Given the interpretation above, the symbolic matrix S 2 can be readily applied to obtain the structure of a PIR scheme for any number of messages M . For M = 3, the structure is as follows.
The queries in Table XIX are defined as follows:
• The x 1 * ∈ V * , x 2 * ∈ V 2 , and x 3 * ∈ V 3 . • The x 1 * and x 2 * are chosen as in Example 7. • The x 3 's are chosen analogously to the x 2 's. • The extra "leftover" term x 2 5 + x 3 5 is chosen uniformly at random, but different than zero. The scheme in Table XIX has rate 5/12. In this scheme, the role of x 2 5 +x 3 5 is to achieve privacy and does not contribute to the decoding process. In this sense, it can be seen as a "leftover" query of the symmetrization. By repeating the scheme r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, so that the "leftover" queries appear in different servers, we can apply the same idea in the one-shot scheme to the "leftover" queries, as shown in Table XX . Thus, we improve the rate from 5/12 to 16/37. How to construct the queries in Table XX will be better explained in Algorithm 1. Here we are only interested in the structure of the scheme. The query structure of the scheme can be represented by the following matrix. 2
The scheme for M = 3 messages was constructed recursively using the one for 2 messages. It is this recursive operation that we call lifting. The main idea behind the lifting operation is that r = 3 entries with value k generate N −r = 1 entry with value k + 1 in the symbolic matrix.
Lifting S 3 to S 4 follows the same procedure: repeat S 3 r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, to produce N −r = 1 4-query. As a result, we obtain the following symbolic matrix.
B. The Symbolic Matrix
In this section we define the symbolic matrix precisely. To do this, we will give a series of preliminary definitions.
In what follows, we denote by N the set of non-negative integers, and by M(N) the set of matrices with entries in N. If S ∈ M(N), we denote the i-th row and j-th column entry of S by S[i, j]. Definition 6. Let S ∈ M(N) be a matrix with N columns. The left shift operation is defined as the matrix σ(S) such that 
Example 11. It holds that τ 2 (2, 1) = (4, 3).
Definition 10. Let B ⊆ N 2 . We denote by π : 2 N 2 → 2 N the function such that π(B) = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ B}.
We are ready to define the symbolic matrix.
Definition 11 (Symbolic Matrices). Let N, M, r ∈ N. The symbolic matrix S (N, M, r) , which we will denote simply by S M , is defined recursively as follows.
The function lift : M(N) → M(N) is given by
. . .
where the matrix A M is constructed as follows.
where l is the number of rows in S M . Then, the matrix A M has #[M, S M ] rows and N columns and is defined such that
Example 13 (Symbolic Matrix for Coded Data). Consider the construction in Section V-A. In this case N = 4 and r = 3.
The construction of S 4 in terms of S 3 takes the following form.
In the next example the matrix A M takes a more complicated form. 
Following the procedure in Definition 11 the symbolic matric S 3 is given by
The set B = [2,
Since τ 1 (b 1 ) = (2, 2) and τ 1 (b 2 ) = (2, 3) it follows that B 1 = {(1, 3) , (2, 2)} and B 2 = {(1, 4), (2, 3)}.
Since π(B 1 ) = {2, 3} and π(B 2 ) = {3, 4}, it follows that
and therefore,
We will now determine S 4 using S 3 . We will re-use the same variables as before so that they are in accordance with Definition 11. We have that 1 1 2 2  1 2 2 1  3  3  3 3  1 2 2 1  2 2 1 1  3 3  3 3
The and therefore, 1 1 2 2  1 2 2 1  3  3  3 3  1 2 2 1  2 2 1 1  3 3  3  3  4 4  4 4 4 4 4 4
(52)
C. Transforming a Symbolic Matrix Into a PIR Scheme
In this section we explain how to transform a symbolic matrix into a PIR scheme. For this, we need the following proposition. Proposition 3. Let S M be the symbolic matrix of a one-shot scheme with codimension r. Then,
Proof. It follows from the lifting operation that 2) Attribute a label to each set B j i and to the entries in the i-th row of S j . 3) Create a symbolic matrix S, with N columns, which consists of K copies of the symbolic matrix S M . 4) For each entry in S with value j create a set of j-queries,
Choose every x m * uniformly at random, but such that all the D i , x m * , for every i ∈ [N ], are linearly independent. 6) For every j = m, choose every x j * uniformly at random, but such that all the D i , x j * , for every i ∈ [T ], are linearly independent. 7) For each labeled set from step 2, use the query equations from the one-shot scheme to determine the rest of the random variables x j * .
Note that step 5 in Algorithm 1 is analogous to the construction in Lemma 1. The number of x m * in the scheme is given by
Analogous to what occurred in Lemma 1, the KN M−1 random variables D k , x m * belong to a space isomorphic to
The same is true for step 6 and privacy follows because, as in Lemma 1, for any collusion of T servers the x j * have the same distribution.
Step 7 allows the user to retrieve, via the decoding equations of the one-shot scheme, the D k , x m * for k ∈ [N ]. Since these span the whole space of possible anwsers, the user is able to retrieve W m (k) for every k ∈ [KN M−1 ]. Theorem 1 (The Refine and Lift Theorem). Let Q be a oneshot scheme of codimension r. Then, refining and lifting Q gives an (N, K, T, M )-PIR scheme Q with rate
Proof. This follows from a direct application of Algorithm 1 to the one-shot scheme, Q. To find the rate we note that each entry k of S M corresponds to M k k-queries, one for each combination of k messages. Thus, using Proposition 3, we can write,
Since We now apply Theorem 1 to the one-shot scheme in Example 2.
Example 15. Consider the setting in Example 2, where the number of servers N = 4, the dimension of the MDS code is K = 1, the user is interested in the first message W 1 out of a total of M = 3 messages, and the user wants privacy against any T = 2 colluding servers. We apply Algorithm 1 to the one-shot scheme in Example 2. Thus, we begin by setting L = KN M−1 = 16.
Step 1: Construct the symbolic matrix S 3 using Definition 11.
This was done in Example 14, obtaining the following symbolic matrix.
Step 2: Attribute a label to each set B j i and to the entries in the i-th row of S j .
We will label the sets using letters from the alphabet, obtaining the following labels, Step 3: Create a symbolic matrix S, with N = 4 columns, which consists of K = 1 copies of the symbolic matrix S 3 .
In this case, since K = 1, S = S 3 .
Step 4: For each entry in S with value j create a set of jqueries, { i∈J x i * : J ⊆ [N ], |J| = j} where each x i * ∈ V i . We obtain the query structure in Table XXI. Step 5: Choose every x m * uniformly at random, but such that all the D i , x m * , for every i ∈ [N ], are linearly independent. Since K = 1, it follows that D 1 = D 2 = D 3 = D 4 which we simply denote by D. Thus, linear independence of the D, x 1 * is equivalent to the set {x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 16 } being chosen uniformly at random but linearly independent.
Step 6: For every j = m, choose every x j * uniformly at random, but such that all the D i , x j * , for every i ∈ [T ], are linearly independent.
As in Step 5, this is equivalent to the sets {x 2 1 , x 2 2 , x 2 8 , x 2 9 , x 2 10 , x 2 13 , x 2 15 , x 2 16 } and {x 3 1 , x 3 2 , x 3 8 , x 3 9 , x 3 10 , x 3 13 , x 3 15 , x 3 16 } being chosen uniformly at random but such that the sets are linearly independent. Step 7: For each labeled set from step 2, use the query equations from the one-shot scheme to determine the rest of the random variables x j * . Applying the query equations, (8) and (9) in Example 2, to the labeled sets in Step 2 we obtain the equations in Table XXII for j = 2, 3.
We show how to retrieve each of the D, x 1 * . The values D 1 , x 1 1 , D 2 , x 1 2 , D 1 , x 1 8 , and D 4 , x 1 7 are obtained directly from the servers. The rest of the values are obtained by using the decoding equations, (10) and (11) in Example 2. We will only show 4 out of 12 equations, each one decoding a D, x 1 * from a different server.
D, x 1 9 = D, x 1 9 + x 2 9 − 1 2 D, x 2 8 − 1 2 D, x 2 7 , (65) D, x 1 13 = D, x 1 13 + x 2 13 + x 3 13 + D, x 2 10 + x 2 10 − D, x 2 4 + x 3 4 . (66) Thus, since the user has all the D, x 1 * , the x 1 1 , . . . , x 1 16 ∈ V 1 are linearly independent, and V 1 has dimension L = 16, the user is able to decode the desired message, W 1 .
VI. APPLICATIONS OF THE REFINE AND LIFT THEOREM
In this section, we refine and lift known one-shot schemes from the literature. We first refine and lift the scheme described in Theorem 3 of [19] . In our notation, this scheme is a oneshot scheme with codimension r = NK−N +T K . Corollary 3. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in Theorem 3 of [19] gives an (N, K, T, M )-PIR scheme Q with
Next, we refine and lift the scheme in [13] . In our notation, this scheme has codimension r = K + T − 1. Thus, we obtain a PIR scheme with rate conjectured to be optimal in [13] but which was later disproven in [16] . The schemes in [16] , however, are limited to the cases where M = 2 and K = N −1 and to a specific case where N = 4, K = 2, T = 2, and M = 2. For the remaining range of parameters, the PIR schemes obtained here in Theorem 1, through refining and lifting, achieve the best rates known so far in the literature. More recently, it was shown in [17] that the rate conjectured in [13] holds for linear PIR schemes. Corollary 1. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in [13] gives an (N, K, T, M )-PIR scheme, Q, with
The rate of the scheme in Corollary 3 is upper bounded by the rate of the scheme in Corollary 1 with equality when either K = 1 or N = K + T . One benefit of the scheme in Corollary 3 over the one in Corollary 1 is that it has a more elementary construction, not requiring the use of the star product. Now, we consider the case of replicated data (K = 1) on N servers with at most T collusions. The T -private linear secret sharing scheme [18] , shown in Definition 4, can be transformed into a capacity achieving PIR scheme.
Corollary 2.
Refining and lifting a T -private linear secret sharing scheme gives an (N, 1, T, M)-PIR scheme Q with capacity-achieving rate
This scheme has the same capacity achieving rate as the scheme presented in [5] , but with fewer queries.
